Abstract. This paper extends a well-known macroeconomic stabilization game between monetary and fiscal authorities introduced by Lambertini (American Economic Review, 93: 1522-1542) to multiplicative (policy) uncertainty. We find that even if fiscal and monetary authorities share a common output and inflation target (i.e. the symbiosis assumption), the achievement of the common targets is no longer guaranteed; under multiplicative uncertainty, in fact, a time consistency problem arises unless policymakers' output target is equal to the natural level.
Introduction
examines the effect of policy uncertainty in the European Union, he finds that multiplicative or model uncertainty is a relevant feature of the European policymaking process. Model uncertainty affects policy-makers' interactions, especially those between fiscal and monetary authorities. Lane (2004) suggests that incorporating multiplicative uncertainty into monetary and fiscal policy formulations is an important modeling priority.
1 Model uncertainty is empirically relevant also for the United States; for instance, by exploiting archives of the model code, coefficients, baseline databases and stochastic shock sets stored after each FOMC meeting between 1996 and 2003, Ironside and Tetlow (2007) document how uncertainty is a substantial problem of the Fed policymaking process. More in general, Taylor (1999) argues that the developments of information technology increase uncertainty about the policymaking process and thus it should increase the interests of economist in studying and modeling its effects.
In a pioneering study, Brainard (1967) 2 shows that multiplicative uncertainty makes the policy-maker more prudent, i.e. under model uncertainty the policy-maker reacts less to disturbances than in the case of certainty. 3 More recently, Peersman and Smets (1999) and Soderstrom (2002) have extended 1 Similar conclusions have been derived by Dornbusch et al. (1998) , Mihov (2001) and ECB (2001) more specifically for monetary policy. They claim that the creation of European Monetary Union is likely to have strengthened the degree of uncertainty surrounding the transmission of monetary policy measures within the union. 2 Indeed, multiplicative (or parameter) uncertainty was first introduced by Holt (1962) , who showed that policy performance would deteriorate when model parameters are uncertain. 3 Holly and Hughes Hallett (1989: 64-67) gives a comprehensive description of multiplicative uncertainty and compare it to additive uncertainty. the Brainard's argument to monetary policy in the European Monetary Union context.
In the spirit of Lane's (2004) observations, a number of authors have attempted to model and evaluate multiplicative uncertainty by considering its effects on optimal monetary policy; 4 in a similar manner, other researchers have focused on the effects of different kind of uncertainty in the conduct of fiscal policy. 5 However, despite the increasing number of studies, the importance of uncertainty in the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies has been neglected; hence, the Lane's (2004) observations have been only partially considered. Our aim is to fill this gap.
Acknowledging the relevance of uncertainty on the effects of policymakers' choices, we evaluate the consequences which are produced on the effects of fiscal policy by the introduction of multiplicative uncertainty in a class of policy games recently developed by Dixit and Lambertini (D&L from now onwards).
6
D&L's models have are particular attractive for our investigation since they consider the interaction between fiscal and monetary stabilization policies in a rather general manner since they consider different assumptions about the transmission mechanisms of the policies. In addition, model uncertainty can be easily introduced in this class of models since D&L observe that additive uncertainty is a very restrictive case and, thus, assume that the private sector 4 See, e.g., Estrella and Mishkin (1999) , Peersman and Smets (1999) , Svensson (1999) , Rudebusch (2001 Rudebusch ( , 2002 , Giannoni (2002) , Lawler (2002) , Schellekens (2002) , Söderström (2002) , Walsh (2003: Section 4) . 5 See Dupuis and Hostland (2001) , Hassett (2002, 2007) . 6 See D&L (2001 See D&L ( , 2003a See D&L ( , and 2003b See also Lambertini (2006) .
is subjected to multiplicative uncertainty.
7
One of the main findings of D&L is related to the effects of the symbiosis assumption. Symbiosis means that fiscal and monetary authorities share identical (ideal or desired) output and inflation targets, but not necessary equal marginal rate of substitutions between these objectives in their preference functions. D&L (2003b) find that symbiosis implies that ideal output and inflation will be always achieved; otherwise policymakers' non-cooperative interactions always lead to inefficient equilibria (see D&L, 2001) . Although this result is obtained in a monetary union, it holds also in a single country. 8 Thus, for the sake of brevity, we will only consider the case of one country, but our results can be easily extended to a monetary union.
We leave this task to further researches.
Our paper studies the effects of multiplicative uncertainty on the stabilization policy under the symbiosis assumption. 9 We show that uncertainty may be no longer neutral (for average outcomes) and may imply different results. In particular, the symbiosis assumption does no longer guarantee the achievement of ideal targets unless the policymakers' ideal output is equal to its natural level, i.e. no cheating incentive. Differently from the perfect information case, a time consistency problem arises, which also implies that monetary and fiscal authorities have to be more conservative than the society in order to minimize a generic social welfare loss. 7 In their model policy-makers do not face uncertainty since they observe all the shocks in the Rogoff's (1983) tradition. 8 See Lambertini (2006) for a discussion. 9 Of course, by assuming additive uncertainty, it is trivial to show that D&L's results on fiscal-monetary interactions hold in expected terms, because of the certainty equivalence. It is worth recalling that all the models discussed are linear-quadratic games.
We restrict ourselves to the case of multiplicative uncertainty on the inflationary effects of fiscal policy and policymakers' simultaneous interactions (the D&L basis case), for the sake of brevity. Robustness of our results to different kinds of multiplicative uncertainty and game timing will be however discussed.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 describes the effects of uncertainty and discusses the robustness of our results. Section 4 studies the optimal design for fiscal and monetary authorities by considering a general social welfare function. A final section concludes.
The economic benchmark 10
The policy-makers' expected losses are defined by the following equations:
(1)
They depend on the deviations of inflation (π ) and real output ( y ) from common targets, π * and y * (i.e. symbiosis assumption The economic model is given by two equations: we assume that, due to distortions in the good markets, the natural level of real output may be too low from a social point of view. This implies: y y * > .
We assume that policy-makers cannot observe a multiplicative shock, i.e.
(for similar specifications, see, among others, Letterie, 1997; Pearce and Sobue, 1997; Lawler, 2002; Schellekens, 2002) . π , and a further contribution arising from fiscal policy. This may be due to the fact that the central bank is, in practice, forced to accommodate fiscal expansion to some extent, or to a change in the equilibrium price of goods depending on the balance between the effects of fiscal policy on aggregate demand and on costs, produced by changes in tax distortions or public investment. Thus c can have either signs and for our scope we assume 0 c > and 0 a > .
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By minimizing the government's loss function with respect to the fiscal instrument subject to equations (2) and (3), we obtain the following first order condition:
In a similar manner we obtain the central bank's first order condition:
It should be noticed that the optimal monetary policy (equation (5)) is unaffected by multiplicative uncertainty. This is so because we have considered the Nash equilibrium and we assumed that the shock is only on the fiscal instrument.
14 If the (multiplicative) shock is perfectly observed by both the central bank and the government, by use of equations (4) and (5) 
Shocks and symbiosis
We now consider the case of an unknown shock. As we said above, optimal monetary policy is not affected by multiplicative uncertainty, whereas the government's expected-reaction function can be re-written as:
By solving equations (6) and (5) we obtain the following reaction functions: By inspecting equations (7) and (8) 
likely to be inactive whereas greater distortions call for a greater fiscal activism. The central bank has a similar symmetric behaviour.
By applying rational expectations to (7) and (8) we get:
equations (9) and (10) imply a policy inconsistency problem, since policy-makers are not able to neutralize the private sector action. From equations (9) and (10) 18 Optimal policy implies equalization of marginal costs and benefits of an inflation increase. When expectations are high, the output is low. Thus the marginal gain of increasing inflation is also high because of policy-makers' quadratic losses. Hence, higher expectations imply looser policies. See again the policy-makers' reaction functions. 19 Recall that, for = , hence output is lower than in the perfect information case since it is completely determined by x (see equation (2)). Equilibrium inflation can be found by using equation (3) and its intercept on the 0 π axis:
since the dashed line passing for N is higher than that passing from C , under uncertainty inflation is higher than in the perfect information case.
Before considering more in detail the effects of policy-makers' uncertainty on the effects of fiscal policy, we would like to briefly discuss the robustness of our results 21 since: a) under perfect information, the symbiosis result holds also for Stackelberg equilibria; 22 b) a major drawback of the policy game approach is usually considered to be the lack of robustness. 23 21 For the sake of brevity, robustness is here only discussed in informal terms. Further results on other possible shock structure (including multiple correlated shocks) are available upon request from the authors. 22 Indeed, D&L distinguish between leadership and commitment equlibria as possible game solutions different from the discretionary one. We discuss the robustness of our results only in the case of the D&L's (Stackelberg) leadership equilibria. Commitment cannot be considered, either as state-contingent-linear or as non-linear rule, since the multiplicative shock is not observable before setting the policy (being a shock on policy effects and not on the state of the economy). 23 In other words, the conclusions reached are often sensitive to the particular assumptions adopted to model the games. Even though the argument raised by this criticism is important, By a considering a comprehensive taxonomy, we find that our main result is rather general. In fact, the symbiosis assumption is not sufficient to guarantee the achievement of ideal outcomes for all the possible game timing and all the possible forms of multiplicative uncertainty (irrespectively of the parameter signs), 24 with the exception of a single non-correlated shock on the semi-elasticity of the inflation surprise term (i.e. a shock on b in equation (2)).
The reason of the above exception is explained as follows. Multiplicative uncertainty influences the coefficient of the uncertain variables in the policy-makers' first order conditions. Thus, in the case of multiplicative uncertainty on the impact of the inflation surprise (measured by b ), its effects on the policy-makers' reactions are fully offset by the rationality of expectations, which implies a zero value for expected inflation surprise in equilibrium.
Summarizing, the symbiosis assumption is not sufficient to guarantee the achievement of ideal outcomes under a very general set of assumptions.
However, it should be noticed that different assumptions entail quite different policy implications, which here are not fully discussed.
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it would be important to distinguish, as argued by Kreps (1990) , between the assumptions which are made on the equilibrium concept and on the players' preference functions which are used. Whereas the existence of different equilibrium concepts is a source of improvement for the "economic science," their misuse is an impoverishment. Similarly, even though minor changes in the analytical model and in agents' preferences may result in quite different features in the performance of economic systems. This is in the nature of the economic process: small changes often correspond to a mutation in the institutional setup. 24 Thus it holds also under monetary policy uncertainty. 25 In particular, different prescriptions arise from model uncertainty in monetary policy, which is studied in a companion paper (see Di Bartolomeo et al. 2007 ).
Some additional results can be easily derived. 26 . 28 The cooperative solution is found by considering the joint minimization of a common loss function. However, in our context, the result can be directly verified from equations (7) and (8) 
where π * , y * , W θ are directly derived from the fundamentals of the economy.
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By using equations (7), (8) and the rational execution constraint n the welfare function, after taking expcatations and a tedious algebra we obtain that in equilibrium, equation (13) (1 ) ( )
The optimal design of institutions, which is obtained by minimizing the above expression (equilibrium expected loss) with respect to the inverses of the degrees of conservativeness ( G θ and B θ ), requires:
We disregard the possibly negative effects of the tax (linear) distortions on the micro-founded welfare loss. This does not affect our results (See Appendix B). 32 Note that equation (13) is minimized by substituting equations (7) and (8) and not equations (8) and (10) into it, since E(π) 2 and E(y) 2 are different from E(π 2 ) and E(y 2 ). 33 From the first order conditions, we obtain two pairs of roots, but only the solution immediately below (equations (15) and (16)) implies that the 2 by 2 Hessian matrix is positive-semi definite: both the determinant and the trace of the Hessian in (13) and (14) is positive; the determinant is instead negative and the trace remains positive (an indeterminate Hessian matrix and a saddle point) when considering the other solution. Moreover, solution (13) and (14) is a global minimum also if the constrains 0 < G θ < +∞ and 0 < B θ < +∞ are considered (no corner solutions). Computations are available upon request.
(16) 0 B θ * = By substituting the above optimal values for the marginal rates of substitution in the Nash equilibrium (i.e. equations (9) and (10)) we obtain for real output and inflation the following values:
( )
The above equations in the social loss function (13) yield:
According to equations (15) and (16) authorities have to be more conservative than society in order to avoid the inflationary temptation and minimize a micro-founded social welfare loss.
As for the optimal institutional design, equations (15) and (16) require a partial division of tasks: the central bank should take care only of inflation stabilization, whereas the government should target both real output and inflation deviations. However, government conservativeness must be higher than the conservativeness of the society in order to avoid the time inconsistency problem. Hence, the central bank must be ultraconservative, irrespectively of social preferences, whereas the optimal inverse degree of conservativeness for the government is finite and dependent on social preferences.
Conclusions
This paper extends a well-known framework of fiscal-monetary interaction by considering that policy-makers may face uncertainty on the effects of their policies.
Our main result is that the symbiosis assumption no longer leads to the achievement of desired or ideal targets if policy-makers are affected by multiplicative uncertainty, unless the desired output is equal to its natural level. The difference with the perfect information context is produced by a time consistency problem that arises only if multiplicative uncertainty is present. Indeed, although we have considered fiscal policy uncertainty and the Nash (discretionary) equilibrium, our main result is general since it is robust with respect to different sources of multiplicative uncertainty and policy regimes. We also show that the minimization of expected target deviations is not equivalent to the minimization of the expected welfare loss. By considering the expected welfare loss, the optimal institutional design asks for a government more conservative than society, so as to eliminate its inflationary temptation and solve the time-consistency problem. This result seems to be in line with the architecture of the European Monetary Union, based on the Stability and Growth Pact and the ECB primary concern on inflation. It is also consistent with the consensus on the need to assign an anti-inflationary priority to central banks, irrespectively of the governments' preferences.
Appendix A
This appendix contains some equations used in the discussion; all of them can be easily derived after tedious algebra. The optimal degrees of conservativeness that can be derived after simple algebra are: The above result confirms the conclusion reached in the main text: the central bank should take account of inflation stabilization only, whereas the government should target both real output and inflation deviations and adopt a degree of conservativeness higher than the social one. By introducing a tax-distortion cost in the welfare function, the optimal degree of government's conservativeness should be even higher. The economic intuition is trivial.
